Miguel Ángel TempranoEconomics, geopolitics and investment
ES·EN
The column by Miguel Ángel Temprano
Home · The column · Geopolitics

Iran: the Persian autumn that will not be the Arab Spring

October 5, 2022· Geopolitics· 9 minute read

We see unrest in Iran every day on the news. Women cutting their hair in public and defying the police. Men supporting them, but a government that refuses to bow to pressure from its citizens. Many hope that the most secretive regime in the the Middle East will finally open up and serve as an example to other countries in the region, but Iran harbours a problem far greater than all that: a crisis of colossal proportions caused by years and years of international sanctions that prevent it from selling its main source of income – oil – abroad.

By Miguel Ángel Temprano

5 October 2022 Reading time: 3.40 mins

The other day I was asked about the possibility that the unrest in Iran might be the prelude to a new revolution, to which I replied that I considered such an outcome highly unlikely and that, at best – provided the protests continued to escalate – I expected the regime to show some minimal sign of openness.

The reason for this conclusion is based on a multitude of factors which I shall analyse later, but undoubtedly the key factor – and the one that sets it apart from the rest – is that the Iranian regime is not a political regime but a religious one. With the exception of Afghanistan – which is undoubtedly a failed state – Iran is the only country in the world with sufficient natural resources to ensure a prosperous economy, yet which is governed not by a political regime but by a religious one.

“Iran is the only stable country with a supreme religious leader rather than a political one”

Let’s take a brief look back at history. In October 1973, the OPEC member states – amongst which the Arab countries held overwhelming sway – decided, in the wake of the Arab alliance’s defeat at the hands of the Israelis in the Yom Kippur War, to make the Jews’ allies pay for that humiliation by raising the price of crude oil, which led to a global inflation crisis.

Iran, as a member of OPEC, did not give its decisive support to these measures, a fact that certainly did not go down well in the Arab world. Let us not forget that they were not Arabs but Persians – a distinction that is by no means trivial – and, moreover, very close allies of the Americans.

The Westernisation carried out by the Shah of Persia – which even included granting women the right to vote – provoked the wrath of religious leaders, particularly that of Ayatollah Khomeini, an Imam who had been in exile in Paris since 1963.

“A Muslim cleric who had been in exile for a decade managed to mobilise many different sections of society, but mainly students”

The difference between Khomeini and the other leaders is that he was not Sunni but Shia – I shall explain the differences later. Towards the end of the decade, with the support of the students – the most religious and radical faction in Persian society – he brought about the overthrow of the Shah and his flight from the country, proclaiming the Islamic Republic of Iran, with Ayatollah Khomeini as its Supreme Leader. From that moment on, Iran came to have a religious government whose fundamental law is Sharia – or rather, the interpretation of Sharia, as each country applies this Supreme Law of the Quran in a different way.

Earlier, I was referring to something that often goes unnoticed but is of vital importance. Iran is Shia, whilst the vast majority of the Muslim world are Sunni or belong to Sunni sub-sects.

Without wishing to go into too much detail, but to help you understand better, I shall explain a little further. Upon Muhammad’s death, leaving no descendants, his followers split into those who believed that the heir to the tenets of the faith should be his cousin, and those who believed it should be his father-in-law. Over the years, as disputes continued, the differences became increasingly irreconcilable. The former are known as Shia and the latter as Sunni.

Well, Ayatollah Khomeini and his entourage were Shia, whilst all the neighbouring countries – which were also members of OPEC – were Sunni. It is worth noting that in all countries where the dominant religion is Sunni, the political regime is a pseudo-‘democracy’, a military dictatorship or a family dictatorship in the form of a monarchy (referred to by different names depending on the country: king, sheikh, caliph, etc.).

“Khomeini succeeded in turning a family dictatorship into a closed religious regime”

But not in Iran. There, they have a supreme leader, known as an Ayatollah, whose authority is not only religious but also political, and who has the power to appoint various political officials in the country.

Although Iran is officially a democracy that

It elects its parliament and its prime minister, who is subject to the authority of the Ayatollah.

Two examples of the Ayatollah’s power: the Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian army’s elite force, reports directly to the Ayatollah rather than to the government. Secondly, the members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Ayatollah himself.

We can now begin to understand the differences between us and other countries, whatever their form of government.

Iran may have a more open-minded or radical government, but always within the limits set by the Ayatollah, who may be more or less liberal; in either case, however, all his decisions will be very conservative in nature and always within the bounds of Sharia, a medieval law.

Of the four types of Muslim head covering – the hijab, niqab, chador and burqa – the hijab is the most moderate of the four, as it leaves the entire face visible. Indeed, this is the one that is compulsory for all women in Iran.
The headscarf crisis is nothing more than the steam escaping from a pot on the verge of bursting due to the Iranian economic crisis

Unfortunately, the movement against the veil seems unlikely to succeed, because even if there were a large majority of Iranians calling for women to be free to wear it or not, many Iranians would still regard it as an integral part of their religion in a country so deeply religious that its highest authority is a cleric.

And can we in the West do anything about it? Well, the answer is no. We can’t, and we’re not going to try.

Curiously, those who claim the right to defend women – as if those of us who do not think like them wanted to mistreat them – are the very ones least likely to speak out, because Iran has been, and remains, the main financier of the European far left. And not because they are left-wing in Iran – they are quite the opposite – but because, given the international ostracism to which we in the West subjected them following the Shi’a clerics’ rise to power, their best option has always been to destabilise democratic European governments.

Economic pressures may lead Iran to achieve its oil export targets sooner than expected

But there is more to it than that: whilst we are in the throes of an unstoppable inflation crisis, triggered by rising energy prices – which in Europe are due not to excess demand but to a shortage of supply – the entry into the market of up to 3.7 million barrels per day in the long term would be a significant factor in moderating prices.

As far as we know, they could immediately bring production up to 100,000 barrels per day, reach 1.0 million in less than a year, and achieve a steady output of up to 3.7 million barrels per day in less than 2.5 years. Bear in mind that global production currently stands at around 100 million barrels a day, with little or no capacity to increase – unless a new player, in this case Iran, is allowed to enter the market.

The new sales licence, resulting from the nuclear deal – which was signed by Obama and scrapped by Trump – appears to be pending the new nuclear deal to be signed with the US, but it could be brought forward in view of the need for oil, and even more so given the imminent reduction in production by OPEC+, which will trigger a further surge in prices now that the price per barrel had stabilised at around $80 a barrel.

And going back to what I said earlier, do we really believe that all the unrest is caused by the issue of wearing the headscarf? If I were to answer that myself, my answer would be a resounding ‘no’.
It’s been years since my last visit to Tehran, but however much things may have changed, I don’t believe the headscarf is the problem; rather, I think it’s the straw that broke the camel’s back.
Iran’s problem is its economic crisis. It is a country grappling with astronomical inflation rates of between 30 and 40 per cent, with years and years of hardship as a result of Western sanctions that prevent it from selling its main source of income – oil – abroad.

We always talk about inflation as a tax on the poor, but few people stop to think about just how ‘expensive’ this tax is for the most disadvantaged. Inflation affects the poor and the rich in the same way. Prices rise equally for both, but it is not the same when, at the end of the day, you have less money left over than if you were already living on the edge, and when, just to survive, you have to do without goods or services – in some cases essential ones – that you used to have.

As inflation becomes chronic, the only thing it generates is poverty, as more and more social groups are drawn into that group which must go without something in order to survive. Well, Iran has been enduring inflation rates above 10 per cent for decades. And why has this not been revealed? Well, for the reasons mentioned earlier: because a rebellion against one’s religious leaders in a deeply religious country is very difficult, if not impossible.

So, even though we support the protesters and Iranian women from the comfort of our sofas – and even in my case, which is not that of left-wing feminists – in every public appearance or statement to the press, it seems to me that they are unlikely to achieve much of significance, because the headscarf is merely a pretext; the reality is their profound economic crisis, from which there is no easy way out.

Share LinkedIn X Email

Get every column by email

You will be told whenever something new is published: a column, an analysis or a research note. No advertising, and your details are never passed on.

One click to unsubscribe in every email.